

# Friendly KEMs

OCSW 2024  
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# Agenda

- 01 What's a KEM?
- 02 Do we need a KEM in Tink?
- 03 Tink quick concepts
- 04 Design considerations
- 05 Tink KEM primitive
- 06 Q&A

# ☰ Hybrid

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[Article](#) [Talk](#)

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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

**Hybrid** may refer to:

- Hybrid Encryption ~ HPKE/ECIES
- Combined/Hybrid KEM ~ X-WING / DHKEM + P256 + KYBER



Community Feedback

(FIPS 203) ML-KEM

SP 800-227

01

# Key Encapsulation Mechanism

# Key Encapsulation Mechanism

- $\text{Generate}() \rightarrow (\mathbf{sk}, \mathbf{pk})$ 
  - Randomized algorithm to generate private & public key pair.
- $\text{Encapsulate}(\mathbf{pk}) \rightarrow (\mathbf{kem}, \mathbf{ss})$ 
  - Randomized algorithm to encapsulate a shared secret  $\mathbf{ss}$ .
- $\text{Decapsulate}(\mathbf{sk}, \mathbf{kem}) \rightarrow \mathbf{ss}$ 
  - Deterministic algorithm to decapsulate the shared secret  $\mathbf{ss}$ .



03

Do we want a public KEM  
primitive in Tink?




# Case Against a KEM

- Contradiction to Tink's philosophy
  - Tink Principle: *Restrict/Limit access to secret key material.*
  - KEM: *Returns secret key material.*
- A KEM is a building block for a use case, could we provide a solution instead?



# Case for a KEM

- NIST Standard = New tool (hammer)
- Hard to create comprehensive solution for every use case.
- We've seen developers use Hybrid Encryption as a KEM.
- Key visibility/auditability restrictions.
- Tink Key Derivation.



# 02 Tink



Multi language, multi-platform,  
and open source

A cryptographic **library** with secure  
APIs that are easy to use correctly,  
and **harder(er)** to misuse.

Carefully design for developers,  
and engineers.

# Tink

- **Design goals:**
  - Secure and easy to use APIs
  - Support for key management
  - Smooth key/algorithmic rotation
  - Extensible
- **Additional Resources:**
  - [RWC OSCW 2023](#) - Tink Mechanics
  - [RWC 2019](#) - Introducing Tink
  - Repos: [github.com/tink-crypto](https://github.com/tink-crypto)
  - Documentation: [developers.google.com/tink](https://developers.google.com/tink)



# Primitive


- Abstract **cryptographic functionality**
- Defines the functionality at a high-level and its security properties
- Similar to interfaces in software development

# Primitives

```
type HybridEncrypt interface {  
    Encrypt(plaintext []byte, contextInfo []byte) ([]byte, error)  
}
```




```
type HybridDecrypt interface {  
    Decrypt(ciphertext []byte, contextInfo []byte) ([]byte, error)  
}
```

# Tink (Structured) Keys

	HPKE Private	KEM: DHKEM_X25519_HKDF_SHA256 KDF: HKDF_SHA256 AEAD: CHACHA20_POLY1305	x:0x04f0... s:0x0a66...
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


# Tink Keysets

Keyset - Hybrid Decrypt				
0x13af		HPKE Private	KEM: DHKEM_P256_HKDF_SHA256 KDF: HKDF_SHA256 AEAD: AES_GCM_256	x:0x5c24... y:0x17cb... s:0x6ba1...
0xa5c8		ECIES Private	Elliptic Curve: P-256 HKDF-HASH: SHA-256 Point Format: uncompressed AEAD Template: {AES-GCM-256}	x:0x9c34... y:0x87ab... s:0x5b41...
0x6d55		HPKE Private	KEM: DHKEM_X25519_HKDF_SHA256 KDF: HKDF_SHA256 AEAD: CHACHA20_POLY1305	x:0x04f0... s:0x0a66...

# Tink Keyset Handle

- Raw bytes access require **restricted** API.
- Can only be exported encrypted  
unrestricted APIs.
- Can also provide Auditability
- Additional Protection (Sanitization, core  
dump protection)



# Tink Keyset Handle Raw Export




# Tink Keyset Handle Raw Export




# Tink Keyset Handle Raw Export - Auditing



# Tink Keyset Handle Export



# Tink Keyset Handle Import




04

# Design Considerations



# Keyset Deriver



```
type KeysetDeriver interface {  
    DeriveKeyset(salt []byte) (*keyset.Handle, error)  
}
```

# Keyset Deriver



KeysetHandle

Keyset - PRF Deriver

#1 PRF:HKDF-HMAC-SHA256 : {AEAD:AES-GCM}

#2 PRF:HKDF-HMAC-SHA256 : {AEAD:AES-CTR-HMAC}

#3 PRF:HKDF-HMAC-SHA256 : {AEAD:AES-GCM}

Derive Key



KeysetHandle

Keyset - AEAD

#1:AES-GCM { ... }

#2 AES-CTR-HMAC { ... }

#3 AES-GCM { ... }

# KEM differences/subtleties




- Randomized
- Implicit Rejection
- KEM Hybridization (algorithmic explosion)
- Security Properties

05

# Tink KEM API



# KEM Structured Keys

0x23fc		DHKEM -Kyber PublicKey	KEM: DHKEM_X25519_HKDF_SHA_256 + KYBER_768 Secret Usage: { StreamingAead: { AES-CTR-HMAC-HKDF } }
0x13af		X-Wing PublicKey	KEM: X-WING Secret Usage: { StreamingAead: AES-GCM-HKDF }
0xd3ca		DHKEM PublicKey	KEM: DHKEM_X25519_HKDF_SHA_256 Secret Usage: { StreamingAead: AES-GCM-HKDF }

# Encapsulate Primitive Definition

```
type KemEncapsulation struct {  
    Ciphertext    []byte  
    KeysetHandle *keyset.handle  
}  
  
type KemEncapsulate interface {  
    Encapsulate() (KemEncapsulation, error)  
}
```

# Primitive Definition

```
type KemDecapsulation interface {  
    Decapsulate(ciphertext[]byte) (*keyset.handle,error)  
}
```

# Existing Bottlenecks



Hybrid Encrypt  
Public Key


A blue key icon with a circular head, positioned below the text.




# Existing Solution




# Asymmetrically Encrypt Files




# A More Composable Primitive



# Decapsulation




# Decapsulating Keysets




# Implicit Rejection



# Tink Key IDs

0xa25f		X-Wing PublicKey	KEM: X-WING Secret Usage: { StreamingAead: AES-GCM-HKDF }
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Ciphertext: 01a25f9da0eb...

# Limitations

- Difference from HybridEncrypt, no stateful algorithms (we thought of an ephemeral KEM)
- Implicit rejection means we require the use of Tink IDs to avoid inconsistencies.
- You get a keyset with some useless keys in keysets.



# 06 Q&A

# Thank you for your time!



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